Forlabs Vault docs

Forlabs Vault security model (one page)

Forlabs Vault lets an AI agent pay only inside limits a user has signed with a passkey. It records every decision so that tampering is always detectable. We do not claim it is "unhackable".

What we hold, and how

Asset Storage Who can use it
Your PG secret key (e.g. Toss test_sk_…) AES-256-GCM. The AAD binds each ciphertext to its tenant and rail. Gate 0 uses an env KEK; KMS/HSM comes after gate 1 Only the charge path, at call time. Never returned or logged
Users' billing keys Same envelope. The AAD binds each key to its instrument row Same
Your API keys sha256 only —
User-token key Ed25519 public key only. You keep the private key —

We never touch settlement funds; money moves PG → you.

What a signature means

  1. The agent can only propose a mandate. It takes effect only when the user signs it with a passkey on our own origin. Signing never happens in your iframe or your app: we send frame-ancestors 'none' and pin both rpId and origin.
  2. The passkey signs H(JCS(mandate) ‖ nonce ‖ mandate_id), so the signature covers the exact bytes displayed. Every signed field is shown on screen, and a test enforces this.
  3. The card is part of the signature through instrument_fingerprint, so a charge on a different card is refused.
  4. User verification (biometric or PIN) is required. Nonces are single-use, and a failed attempt still burns its nonce.

What we enforce

How tampering is detected

Accepted risks (stated, not hidden)

Report a vulnerability

Email support@forlabs.io. We acknowledge within 2 business days.